Leninism, Asian Culture and Singapore (Part 4) posted on Monday, December 20, 2004
Almost alone among all the feudal societies, imperial China has had
many intellectual admirers. While Europe was still ruled by petty
princes governing small fiefdoms and engaged in incessant wars, a
unified China as achieving high levels of stability and culture, with
a government of scholars rather than warriors. The imperial
examinations were particularly praised: Hardworking and patient men
who spent a life time practising calligraphy, poetry and essay writing
were rewarded with government offices on the basis of their
examination results. This gave suitable members of the lower class the
chance to join the elite, rather than as potential troublemakers
outside the system. It is no accident that two of the most famous
leaders of peasant rebellions, Huang Chao and Hung Xiuquan, were both
unsuccessful candidates in the examinations before starting their
dynasty-wrecking careers.
The idea of achieving status, wealth and happiness through good
scholarship is deeply engrained in Chinese culture. Chinese folktales
and operas are full of stories of a young man marrying his dream girl
after passing his examination - perhaps simply because of the increase
in his eligibility; or in longer and more romantic stories, by using
his position to rescue his girlfriend from prison, bandits, a rich
man's house hold, etc. Poems blatantly say things like "In the book
there are houses of gold; in the book there is beauty like jade..."
Even the more downmarket kungfu stories usually have the hero (or
sometimes, heroine) achieving greatness after developing his/her
fighting power by learning from a superior master or by coming across
a wonder instruction text, nothing other than scholarship of a more
physical kind.
In Singapore and other former colonies, there is a second important
tradition: promising native boys(girls were not usually acceptable in
those days) were selected for education in the ruling country and then
appointed to the civil service at home, so that they could help their
colonial masters to govern their own people. These two traditions form
the cultural basis of Singapore's meritocratic policy: Rulers must be
well educated, and usually they must be educated in elite universities
of the west, where they can absorb the ideas of liberal democratic
government and modern capitalism, and form personal connections with
future leaders of the host nations as well as others. Good scholastic
achievements of this kind are the pre-requisite to higher things in
later life.
To directly implement this policy, the government of Singapore,
including the armed forces, education service, economic development
agencies and government controlled corporations, recruits a large
number of 18-year old high school graduates on the bases of their
Cambridge A-level examination results and interview performances, as
government cadets to be sent to universities in Britain, US and other
countries on a kind of indentured labour contract: In return for the
payment of tuition fees, living allowances and other expenses during
the study, they are required to work in the Singapore government
sector for a number of years; otherwise, repayment of the "bond" with
interest is required, normally beyond the ability of the average
indentured cadet. That is, there is a high penalty for leaving the
system.
At the same time, the reward for staying with the system is also very
high. A returned cadet's job performance is carefully watched by his
superiors and by the original sponsoring agency, and good performers
are given fast promotions and are often placed into important
positions very early. A rising star often commands power well above
his official position, because he/she would usually have high level
patrons whose direct access can be used to facilitate matters, and
he/she also commands deference from his/her peers who would be
reluctant to offend a person on the move up. This produces a situation
of "positive feedback", where good performance leads to greater power
and influence, and then even better performance. Despite these, the
government has been constantly concerned about the difficulty of
finding good candidates for high public positions. A somewhat
paradoxical Newtonian dynamics seems to be at play with every action
generating a reaction. A promising government cadet is immediately
attractive to private companies, especially multinational subsidiaries
in Singapore, because of their familiarity with the rules and
regulations and of their access to powerful people. Cadets are often
enticed to better paying jobs outside the public sector after a few
years, sometimes with the new employer expending large sums of money
to discharge the remainder of the bond.
Further, once a large number of fast track cadets are in the system,
it becomes harder to recruit non-cadets: in the competition for
promotion and for the attention of powerful patrons, it would appear
that cadets should enjoy an advantage; among other things, they are
less likely to quit and so are safer choices for critical positions
and positions requiring considerable training and investment. Hence, a
marginally unsuccessful candidate for a government cadetship has the
tendency to write off the possibility of a government career
altogether, for his/ her prospects would appear to be significantly
inferior to those of a marginally successfully candidate, even though
the difference between their abilities is only marginal.
Consequently, another plank of the meritocratic system was introduced:
public sector salaries must be pegged to private sector salaries. In
particular the salaries of ministers and senior civil servants should
be comparable to those of corporate chief executives, judges to
lawyers in private practice, and so on. The public sector executive
salary scales were repeatedly revised upwards, such that now even
junior ministerial salaries exceed that of the President of USA. With
the strong economy generating high tax revenues, and with a relatively
small civil service, the higher salaries are well affordable. They
certainly showed their effect in reducing mid-level civil service
staff turnover and increasing recruitment success. A second
justification, that highly paid politicians and civil servants have
less temptation to be corrupt, is more difficult to quantify, but the
argument seems logical enough in the abstract. So the official story
is that Singapore has an efficient government controlled by well
educated, well paid and honest public servants whose positions are
attained for their merit and job performance. Because of this, the
correct social and economic policies are implemented, resulting in
productivity and prosperity, and generating high tax revenues to
continue paying the public servants well. Here we have another
positive feedback cycle. Also, with money available and smart
officials on selection panels, Singapore can afford to send even
larger numbers of promising youngsters for overseas studies and to
make them promising public servants of the future. Yet another
feedback cycle. As one would suspect, such a picture is too simple to
be exactly true. The life of a mandarin isno where so rosy. I now
discuss some of the complexities not so readily visible.
--
4. The Mandarins
Almost alone among all the feudal societies, imperial China has had
many intellectual admirers. While Europe was still ruled by petty
princes governing small fiefdoms and engaged in incessant wars, a
unified China as achieving high levels of stability and culture, with
a government of scholars rather than warriors. The imperial
examinations were particularly praised: Hardworking and patient men
who spent a life time practising calligraphy, poetry and essay writing
were rewarded with government offices on the basis of their
examination results. This gave suitable members of the lower class the
chance to join the elite, rather than as potential troublemakers
outside the system. It is no accident that two of the most famous
leaders of peasant rebellions, Huang Chao and Hung Xiuquan, were both
unsuccessful candidates in the examinations before starting their
dynasty-wrecking careers.
The idea of achieving status, wealth and happiness through good
scholarship is deeply engrained in Chinese culture. Chinese folktales
and operas are full of stories of a young man marrying his dream girl
after passing his examination - perhaps simply because of the increase
in his eligibility; or in longer and more romantic stories, by using
his position to rescue his girlfriend from prison, bandits, a rich
man's house hold, etc. Poems blatantly say things like "In the book
there are houses of gold; in the book there is beauty like jade..."
Even the more downmarket kungfu stories usually have the hero (or
sometimes, heroine) achieving greatness after developing his/her
fighting power by learning from a superior master or by coming across
a wonder instruction text, nothing other than scholarship of a more
physical kind.
In Singapore and other former colonies, there is a second important
tradition: promising native boys(girls were not usually acceptable in
those days) were selected for education in the ruling country and then
appointed to the civil service at home, so that they could help their
colonial masters to govern their own people. These two traditions form
the cultural basis of Singapore's meritocratic policy: Rulers must be
well educated, and usually they must be educated in elite universities
of the west, where they can absorb the ideas of liberal democratic
government and modern capitalism, and form personal connections with
future leaders of the host nations as well as others. Good scholastic
achievements of this kind are the pre-requisite to higher things in
later life.
To directly implement this policy, the government of Singapore,
including the armed forces, education service, economic development
agencies and government controlled corporations, recruits a large
number of 18-year old high school graduates on the bases of their
Cambridge A-level examination results and interview performances, as
government cadets to be sent to universities in Britain, US and other
countries on a kind of indentured labour contract: In return for the
payment of tuition fees, living allowances and other expenses during
the study, they are required to work in the Singapore government
sector for a number of years; otherwise, repayment of the "bond" with
interest is required, normally beyond the ability of the average
indentured cadet. That is, there is a high penalty for leaving the
system.
At the same time, the reward for staying with the system is also very
high. A returned cadet's job performance is carefully watched by his
superiors and by the original sponsoring agency, and good performers
are given fast promotions and are often placed into important
positions very early. A rising star often commands power well above
his official position, because he/she would usually have high level
patrons whose direct access can be used to facilitate matters, and
he/she also commands deference from his/her peers who would be
reluctant to offend a person on the move up. This produces a situation
of "positive feedback", where good performance leads to greater power
and influence, and then even better performance. Despite these, the
government has been constantly concerned about the difficulty of
finding good candidates for high public positions. A somewhat
paradoxical Newtonian dynamics seems to be at play with every action
generating a reaction. A promising government cadet is immediately
attractive to private companies, especially multinational subsidiaries
in Singapore, because of their familiarity with the rules and
regulations and of their access to powerful people. Cadets are often
enticed to better paying jobs outside the public sector after a few
years, sometimes with the new employer expending large sums of money
to discharge the remainder of the bond.
Further, once a large number of fast track cadets are in the system,
it becomes harder to recruit non-cadets: in the competition for
promotion and for the attention of powerful patrons, it would appear
that cadets should enjoy an advantage; among other things, they are
less likely to quit and so are safer choices for critical positions
and positions requiring considerable training and investment. Hence, a
marginally unsuccessful candidate for a government cadetship has the
tendency to write off the possibility of a government career
altogether, for his/ her prospects would appear to be significantly
inferior to those of a marginally successfully candidate, even though
the difference between their abilities is only marginal.
Consequently, another plank of the meritocratic system was introduced:
public sector salaries must be pegged to private sector salaries. In
particular the salaries of ministers and senior civil servants should
be comparable to those of corporate chief executives, judges to
lawyers in private practice, and so on. The public sector executive
salary scales were repeatedly revised upwards, such that now even
junior ministerial salaries exceed that of the President of USA. With
the strong economy generating high tax revenues, and with a relatively
small civil service, the higher salaries are well affordable. They
certainly showed their effect in reducing mid-level civil service
staff turnover and increasing recruitment success. A second
justification, that highly paid politicians and civil servants have
less temptation to be corrupt, is more difficult to quantify, but the
argument seems logical enough in the abstract. So the official story
is that Singapore has an efficient government controlled by well
educated, well paid and honest public servants whose positions are
attained for their merit and job performance. Because of this, the
correct social and economic policies are implemented, resulting in
productivity and prosperity, and generating high tax revenues to
continue paying the public servants well. Here we have another
positive feedback cycle. Also, with money available and smart
officials on selection panels, Singapore can afford to send even
larger numbers of promising youngsters for overseas studies and to
make them promising public servants of the future. Yet another
feedback cycle. As one would suspect, such a picture is too simple to
be exactly true. The life of a mandarin isno where so rosy. I now
discuss some of the complexities not so readily visible.
--